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The First Five-Year Span (1989-1994): Law and 
Religion in Post-Communist Hungary 
Helen E. Hartnell' 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal status of religion in Hungary was transformed dur-
ing the first post-Communist era from 1989 to 1994. This article 
examines the situation in Hungary at the end of that era, when 
Hungary was on the verge of changing from a conservative to a 
new socialist government-a time of transition within transition. 
By scrutinizing this suspended moment before the pendulum's 
weight dropped back from one extreme position and started its 
swing in the opposite direction, we can easily appreciate the vast 
distance travelled from Communist-era atheist rule. This exer-
cise further enables us to establish a benchmark against which 
later developments under Gyula Horn's socialist government can 
be measured. 
Only passing conclusions can sensibly be drawn in the con-
text of a society still undergoing an encompassing transforma-
tion. Yet it is clear that the first post-Communist government in 
Hungary embraced Locke's notion that religious tolerance can 
have a positive, stabilizing effect on society.l Indeed, the conser-
vative Antall government unambiguously asserted that churches 
should help the state to shoulder the burden of reestablishing 
* Associate Professor of Law, Central European University, Legal Studies 
Department, Budapest, Hungary. This article is based on a paper given in July 1994 
at the International Association of Religious Freedom Conference on Religion and 
Human Rights in Europe, held in Cluj, Romania. I am grateful to W. Cole Durham, Jr., 
Maryellen Fullerton, Kim Lane Scheppele, and Keith Werhan for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper, and to Amir Abdi and Viktor Nyiri for their valuable 
research assistance. 
1. JOHN LoCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING ToLERATION (James H. Tully ed., 1983). 
For an in-depth analysis of the social and political aspects of religion in Hungary, see 
Peter Paczolay, The Role of Religion in Reconstructing Politics in Hungary (1994) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author); see also FRIEDRICH HAINBUCH, KtRCHE 
UNO STAAT IN UNGARN NACH OEM ZWElTEN WELTKRlEG [CHURCH AND STATE IN HUNGARY 
AFrER WORLD WAR II) (1982) (historical analysis of church·state relations in Hungary 
during the Communist era). 
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civil society in Hungary. From the perspective of the churches, 
the exhilaration of freedom was accompanied by weighty respon-
sibility, as well as by enormous practical difficulties. 
The goals of this article are to examine the most significant 
developments in Hungary during the 1989-1994 period and to 
situate them in the larger context of international human-rights 
law. Mter briefly setting forth an analytical framework for reli-
gious liberty and the separation of church and state, this article 
describes and analyzes the pertinent Hungarian laws and court 
decisions, and concludes that despite significant improvement in 
religion's legal status, its actual situation is precarious. 
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 
Legal scholars generally understand religious liberty to en-
compass both individual and collective (i.e., group) rights against 
the state, and to encompass internal processes of thought and 
conscience as well as the exercise or external manifestation of 
belief or disbelief.2 It is also widely accepted that faith vel non 
2. These aspects of religious liberty are clearly reflected in the nearly identical 
provisions found in leading international human-rights treaties. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, art. 18, 
U.N. Doc. Al810 (1948), provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, 
either alone or in co=unity with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (hereinafter 
European Convention), provides: 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 
18, S. TREATY Doc. No.2, 95th Congo 1st Sess. (1977), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter 
International Covenant), provides: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in Worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
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belongs to the domaine prive and is absolute, but that the state 
may impose some limits when "religious belief is manifested by 
word or act."3 Further, the state may only limit religious liberty 
by means of neutral, secular laws that are necessary in a demo-
cratic society to protect public order, health, morals, safety, or 
the rights of third parties.4 
While civil libertarians throughout the world share similar 
views on many fundamental aspects of religious freedom, one 
key distinction must be highlighted. The First Amendment to 
the U.S. ConstitutionS is framed solely in terms of a limit on the 
government's power to affect religion, whereas the formulations 
found, for example, in international and in Hungarian law im-
pose some obligation on government to promote or protect 
thought, conscience, or religion. This difference between "nega-
tive" and "positive" rights6 points to an important difference in 
attitude towards the role of the state in religious life. Stated 
3. See, e.g., Imre Takacs, On the Legal Regulation of the Freedom of Conscience 
and Religion, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN TODAV'S HUNGARY 133, 136 (M. Katona Soltesz ed., 
1990). This Hungarian author explains that manifestation brings religious belief "'into 
communication with the law and order of the state. So the external exercise of religion 
must also remain within the limits of the law and order as every manifestation of the 
individual freedom in general'" [d. (quoting M6ruc ToMScANYl, MAGYAROnszAG KOUOGA 
[PUBLIC LAw OF HUNGARY) 193 (1940». 
4. See, e.g., European Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2) ("Freedom to manifest 
one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others."); International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 18(3) ("Freedom to 
manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."). But cf. Employment Div., Dep't 
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (holding that neutral laws do 
not raise free exercise problems and thus, under U.S. law, there is no need to show 
that the restrictions are necessary). 
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that these First Amendment prohibitions also apply to the States. The 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, like other 
"fundamental rights" protected by the Bill of Rights, are deemed to be "incorporated" 
into the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
6. See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CUI. 
L. REv. 864 (1986). 
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simply, Americans typically expect the state to refrain from in-
terfering in religious life, whereas others expect the state to en-
able it.7 
This oversimplified explanation of the difference between 
negative and positive rights can facilitate our understanding of 
more subtle and complex differences in attitude towards the 
proper degree of separation or, conversely, the acceptable degree 
of identification ("establishment") between church and state. The 
starting point for analysis of church-state separation is to recog-
nize that both the Hungarians and the United States Constitu-
tions expressly address the issue, while the international 
human-rights instruments fail to mention it. This incongruity 
compels an interrogation of the role of church-state separation, 
and its relationship to the exercise of religious liberty. 
Comparative studies suggest the existence of an inverse rela-
tionship between the degree of church-state identification and 
the degree of tolerance for religious liberty.9 The extreme posi-
tions of complete church-state identification (i.e., a theocracy or 
established church) and complete dis-identification (Le., hostility 
towards and persecution of religion) usually correlate with a low 
tolerance for free exercise of religion, whereas more moderate 
degrees of church-state identification tend to correlate with 
higher tolerance. Within this moderate zone of tolerance, numer-
ous types of church-state relationships can be identified, includ-
7. It goes without saying that some Americans do not adhere to the traditional 
"negative rights" position and want the government to provide support for religion. 
8. A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 60(3) (Hung.), 
translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 
1995) ("In the Republic of Hungary the church functions in separation from the 
State."); see also Act IV of 1990, Tiirveny a lelkiismereti es a vnllasszabadsagr61, 
valamint az egyhazakr6l fAct on Religion, Freedom of Conscience, and Churches] 
§ 15(1), auailable at <http://www.spidenveb.hulcgi-bin/jrxs?-hl.1990.4+-ml> (visited Nov. 
27, 1996) ("The Church functions separated fsicl from the state in Hungary.") (unofficial 
translation on file with author). 
9. The framework presented here is imperfectly based on W. Cole Durham, Jr., 
Perspectiues on Religious Liberty: A Comparatiue Framework, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (Johan D. Van der Vyver & 
John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). See also Paczolay, supra note 1, at 2 (emphasizing correctly 
that "there are more or less clear standards of constitutionnlism in general, for the 
relation of church and state does not exist a 'Western' model, but countries differ in 
their solutions.") 
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ing endorsement,10 cooperation,l1 accommodation,12 and separa-
tion.13 The choice among these various options does not necessar-
ily affect the degree of protection actually accorded to the exer-
cise of religious liberty. Thus, if one were principally concerned 
with promoting free exercise, it would be possible to choose from 
a range of degrees of church-state separation. l4 
However, it is not enough to view the church-state separation 
as merely a technique for ensuring-or even as a precondition 
to-religious liberty. Indeed, the relationship between church 
and state is an issue of independent significance, inasmuch as it 
represents a choice between competing values that carries with 
it enormous practical consequences. The precise nature and in-
tensity of the church-state relationship reflect profound choices 
about the allocation of public resources and the nature of civic 
life. U.S. citizens, for example, tend to be committed (at least 
rhetorically) to church-state separation, although there has been 
some movement towards accommodation. In Hungary, on the 
other hand, the system is a cooperationist one, with some 
accommodationist undertones, confounded by occasional 
separationist rhetoric. Still, one can discern common ground, 
despite these subtle differences between American and Hungar-
ian attitudes towards separation. l5 
10. Some states acknowledge the special role played by a particular church, 
without going so far as to designate it the official church of the country. 
11. In the cooperation model, there is no established or endorsed church, but the 
state cooperates closely with churches in various ways, such as by financing religious 
activities or by collecting contributions on behalf of the church (e.g., the German 
Kirchensteuer). 
12. The accommodation model is characterized by the state's "benevolent 
neutrality" toward religion-including a policy of providing exceptions to generally 
applicable laws that burden some because of their religious beliefs (e.g., conscientious 
objectors)-but there is no direct state funding of religion. 
13. The separationist model tends to produce more rigid separation between 
public and religious life. In a strict separationist system, there would be no direct. or 
indirect state funding for religious activities, no religious c.xceptions from generally 
applicable laws, no religious teaching in public schools, and no religious symbols in 
public. 
14. See, e.g., Durham, supra note 9, at 19·25; see also STATE AND CUURCU IN TIlE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996). 
15. For example, one might expect some American separationists to support the 
position of the Catholic bishops in Hungary who, in response to prc-election criticism 
that the priests were violating church·state separation by speaking about political 
parties from the pulpit, issued a communique firmly rejecting attempts to push the 
church behind walls, even though others (e.g., Bruce Ackerman) might be c.xpected to 
adhere to a stricter belief that religious premises should not be brought. into the public 
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Each society must therefore determine both the optimal level 
of protection to be accorded to free exercise of religion, and the 
optimal degree of separation between church and state. Yet 
these challenges pale in comparison to the task of resolving the 
tension between the fundamental rights of religious liberty and 
of equality.I6 Tension is created when any special action or rule 
designed to promote or protect religious liberty simultaneously 
discriminates against nonreligious individuals or groups. The 
difficult task facing legislators and courts is ascertaining the 
proper balance between these occasionally incompatible rights. 
III. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARY PERTAINING 
TO RELIGION 
Hungarian legal developments pertaining to religion during 
the 1989-1994 period fell within the mainstream of the theoreti-
cal framework that pervades international human-rights dis-
course. This claim of normalcy, however, must be made within 
the peculiar framework of post-Communist transition and must 
be qualified by warnings pertaining to certain proposed legisla-
tive changes. 
A. Constitutional Framework 
The October 23, 1989 amendment to the 1949 constitution of 
the Republic of Hungary provides the domestic constitutional 
framework for analyzing the legal status of religion in Hun-
gary.I7 This so-called amendment-which actually amounted to a 
total revision of the former constitution-is based on the princi-
ple of rule of law, including the protection of fundamental 
arena. See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (providing that an American church can lose 
its tax-exempt status if it endorses particular candidates or if a substantial proportion 
of its activities are devoted to lobbying). 
16. See A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution) art. 70/A(1) (Hung.), 
translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note B ("The 
RepUblic of Hungary shall guarantee for everyone in its territory all human and civil 
rights without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."); see 
also Act IV of 1990, Torveny a lelkiismereti es a valhisszabadsagr61, valnmint az 
egyhazakr61 [Act on Religion, Freedom of Conscience, and Churches) § 3(1), available 
at <http://www.spiderweb.hu/cgi-binljrxs?-hl.1990.4+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 1996) 
(providing that "[n)obody shall be at any disadvantage nor shall have any advantage 
for his/her religion or conviction") (unofficial translation on file with author). 
17. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution) (Hung.). 
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rights. IS According to Article 8 of the 1989 constitution, a funda-
mental right cannot be abridged, not even by an act of Parlia-
ment. The key provision defining fundamental religious rights is 
Article 60, which provides: 
(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone has the right to 
the freedom ofthought, conscience and religion. 
(2) This right includes the free choice or acceptance of reli-
gion or any other conviction according to one's conscience, and 
the liberty to express, or refuse to express, to exercise or teach 
one's religion and conviction through the performance of reli-
gious acts and rites, either individually or together with others. 
either publicly or in a closed circle. 
(3) In the Republic of Hungary the church functions in sep-
aration from the State.19 
In addition to this broad constitutional prOVISion, Hungary 
has undertaken similar and occasionally even more eA1;ensive 
obligations under various international human-rights treaties, 
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms20 and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights.21 Hungary has also signed 
18. See Andras Saj6, Reading the Inuisible Constitution: Judicial Reuiew in 
Hungary, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (1995). 
19. A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG ALKOThIANYA (Constitution) (Hung.), translated in 
CONsrrrUTIoNs OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note S. 
20. European Convention, supra note 2. The Convention entered into effect in 
Hungary pursuant to Act XXXI of 1993, Torveny az emberi jogok es az alapvet6 
szabadsagok vedelmer61 sz616, ROmaban, 1950. november 4-en kelt Egyezmeny e.s az 
ahhoz tartoz6 nyolc kiegeszitO jegyz6konyv kihirdeteserol, auai/able at 
<http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-hl.1993.31+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 1996). 
21. Supra note 2. The International Covenant entered into effect in Hungary 
pursuant to Law-Decree No. 8 of April 22, 1976. Torvenyerejli rendelet az Egyesult 
Nemzetek Kozgytilese XXI. iilesszakan, 1966. december I6-an elfogadott Polgari e.s 
Politikai Jogok Nemzetkozi Egyezsegokmanya kihirdeteserol, auai/able at 
<http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h2.1976.8+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 1996). The 
International Covenant provides: 
L Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights22 and the Helsinki 
Accord,23 adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-opera-
tion in Europe. 
B. Laws Passed by the Hungarian Parliament 
In the period after 1989, the Hungarian Parliament passed 
two major laws on religion, which are examined below, as well as 
numerous other laws affecting religion, some of which are briefly 
mentioned in the following discussion. 
1. Act IV of 1990 (Act on Religion, Freedom of Conscience, and 
Churches) 
Act IV of 199024 swept away the network of laws that previ-
ously governed religion, and implemented Article 60 of the 1989 
constitution. This law contains everything from detailed provi-
sions governing the content of religious liberty25 to itemized reg-
others. 
4. The State Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect 
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the 
religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions. 
International Covenant, supra note 2, art. 18. 
22. Supra note 2, art. 18 ("Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.") 
23. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki 
Accord), Aug. 1, 1975, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975) (entered into effect in Hungary 
in 1981). Article VII guarantees respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, while Article VIII 
guarantees equal rights and self-determination of peoples. 
24. Act IV of 1990, Torveny a lelkiismereti es a vallasszabadsagr61, valamint az 
egyhazakr6l [Act on Religion, Freedom of Conscience, and Churches], available at 
<http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-bin.1rxs?-h1.1990.4+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 1996) (unofficial 
translation on file with author). This Act was passed by the old Parliament which still 
had a Communist majority. The new Parliament was seated after the free elections in 
March and April 1990. The ensuing conservative government was composed of the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Independent Smallholders' Party, and the Christian 
Democrats, all of which emphasized the importance of restoring Christian values. 
Paczolay, supra note 1, at 8. 
25. For example, Chapter One (§§ 1-8) of Act IV of 1990 covers the right of 
freedom of conscience and religion. In addition to provisions declaring the freedom of 
conscience and religion to be a "fundamental liberty," § 1, and elaborating a definition 
of this freedom, § 2, it clearly states that parents (or guardians) have the right to 
make decisions concerning the moral and religious education of minor children, § 5. 
Chapter One also ensures that persons at "social, [health care], or chiId- or youth-
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ulations governing the church-state relationship.26 Section 8 sets 
forth the right of persons to create autonomous churches, while 
section 16 expressly prohibits the state from setting up an organ 
or body to guide or supervise them.27 Results of a 1993 survey 
released by the Prime Minister's Office showed the religious de-
mography of Hungary as: 70% Catholic, 20% Calvinist, 5% Lu-
theran, and 5% other.28 
Act IV of 1990 lays down the procedure for registering 
churches in Hungary, which is necessary if a church wants to 
become a legal entity, to own property, and to be eligible for tax-
exempt status. The procedure simply requires that a church hav-
ing at least 100 members adopt organizational rules, bylaws, and 
statutes, and elect leaders.29 Once this has been accomplished, 
the person authorized to represent the church must present the 
required documents to the appropriate local court.30 The only 
reason the court may give for refusing to register a church is fail-
ure to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in sec-
tions 8, 9, and 10.31 The law imposes no substantive limitation, 
welfare institutions and ... confined in penitentiary establishments: § G, as well as 
persons "doing ... military service," § 7, shall have the right to exercise this freedom. 
Section 3 further mandates that: 
(1) Nobody shall be at any disadvantage nor shall have any advantage for 
hislher religion or conviction, or for enouncing or e.'Cercising them. 
(2) No particulars related to the religious or other conviction shall be 
entered in any state (governmental) register. 
Act IV of 1990 § 3. 
26. Chapter Two of Act IV of 1990 contains provisions on registration of churches, 
§§ 9-13; federations of churches, § 14; the interrelationship between church and state, 
§§ 15-16; cultural, social, and [health carel activities of the churches, § 17; finances of 
the churches, §§ 18-19; and striking churches off the register, §§ 20·21. 
27. Act IV of 1990, § 8(1) ("Persons following identical articles of faith shall have 
the right to create autonomous religio\usl communities, denominations, churches ... 
with the view of exercising their religion."); id. § 16(1) ("No organ or body for guiding 
or supervising the Churches shall be set up by the State."). 
Church affairs are overseen by the Department of Church Relations (Egyhcizj 
Kapcsolarok F6oszt6iy) within the Ministry of Culture and Education. The Communist-
era State Office for Church Affairs was disbanded in 1989. 
28. This same survey suggested that there had been Ulittle change· over the past 
decade in the religious composition of the population. 
29. Act IV of 1990, § 9(1). 
30. Id. § 10. 
31. [d. § 11 ("The notification aimed at registering can be refused if it is not in 
conformity with the provisions of Section 8 or the founders did not comply \vith the 
requirements provided in Sections 9 and 10."). 
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other than the requirement in section 8 that the church's activity 
not violate the constitution or any other law.32 
Once registered, a church may engage in various ecclesiasti-
cal activities,33 may raise money for its support, and may even 
engage in business activities.34 Section 19 guarantees state fi-
nancial support for designated church activities and permits 
churches to apply for government subsidization of other activi-
ties, including (but not expressly limited to) the "operation of ... 
educational, social, [health care], sporting, child- and youth-wel-
fare institutions.,,35 
Fifty-four churches had been registered in Hungary as of 
mid-1994. Of these, only thirty-two were allotted a share of the 
4.4 billion HUF budgeted by the state to support church activi-
ties in Hungary in 1994.36 The remaining twenty-two churches 
either did not apply for financial support or applied but were 
turned down.37 
32. Id. § 8(2} ("A church may be founded with the view of perfonning any 
religious activity not in contradiction with the Constitution and not prohibited by 
law."). 
33. See, e.g., id. § 17 (permitting churches to engage in "any educational, cultural, 
social, [health carel, sporting, or child- and youth-welfare activities not exclusively 
reserved by law for the State," and to offer religious education in public schools). 
34. Id. § 18: 
(1) The assets of an ecclesiastic legal entity can be fonned, first of all, at 
[sicl donations and other contributions granted by natural persons, bodies 
corporate, organizations not qualifying as bodies corporate, as well as fees for 
ecclesiastical services. Any ecclesiastic legal entity shall be entitled to collect 
donations in compliance with the bye-laws [sicl and rules of the Church 
without possessing a particular pennission. 
(2) With the view of providing for the financial conditions necessary for 
implementing its aims, the ecclesiastic legal entity shall have the right to 
carryon economic-entrepreneurial activities, to float an enterprise in 
conformity with the rules on social organizations (Civil Code, Sections 70 to 
73), as well as to set up, or participate in, an economic association. 
(3) The ecclesiastic legal entity shall not be considered as carrying on 
economic-entrepreneurial activities, if it 
a} operates cultural, educational, social, [health carel or child- and 
youth-welfare institutions, 
b) produces and disposes of publications and devotional objects 
required for religious life, 
c} partially exploits buildings utilized for ecclesiastical purposes, 
d} keeps a cemetery. 
35. Id. § 19(1}. 
36. In special cases, the amount of support received was nominal. For example, 
the Hare Krishna Society was slated to receive 1,000 HUF (worth about $10.00) under 
the 1994 budget. 
37. The three churches which requested but were denied support were tho 
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Legislation proposed in 1993 would have changed the regis-
tration requirements and required all churches to re-register.38 
The purpose of this proposal was to curb evangelism and the ac-
tivities of so-called "destructive" sects. Despite the absence of 
formal investigations, the Parliament considered allegations that 
certain "destructive" organizations (i.e., the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses, the Church of Scientology, the Unification Church, and 
the Hare Krishna Society) were breaking up families and posing 
the danger of "Americanization" to Hungarian society. The pro-
posed changes would have significantly tightened the registra-
tion process by requiring an applicant church which had not been 
in Hungary for over 100 years to provide a list containing the 
names of 10,000 members, and to submit its articles of faith or 
tenets of belief. Further, the proposed law would have required a 
determination whether the applicant church's activities and be-
liefs were consistent with "generally accepted morals." 
The proposed legislation was vigorously debated but was not 
enacted into law prior to the 1994 election.39 Had the proposed 
legislation been enacted, it would arguably have constituted a 
violation of Hungary's obligations under Article 18 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights40 and under Prin-
ciple 16c of the Vienna Concluding Document:1l The proposal to 
re-register churches under more stringent criteria is not being 
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Scientology, and the Unification Church. 
38. See generally W. Cole Durham, Jr., Against De-Registration of Religious 
Organizations (1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing the 
proposed legislation and its potential impact). 
39. Speidl, the sponsor of the bill, argued that members of Parliament were 
qualified to ascertain those "traditional norms that have formed over centuriesD and 
that are "unambiguous to everyone." The Catholic Church argued that public morality 
is generally interpreted as the public opinion on morals, that this public opinion is 
basically determined by the Catholic Church in Europe, and that groups violating this 
order of values do not meet the requirements of public morality. Meszaros, the leader 
of the opposition to the proposal, considered the proposed standard too subjective and 
capable of abuse, and argued that the requirement to submit a list of the names of 
10,000 church members would seriously endanger the right to privacy. 
40. Supra note 2, art. 18; see also General Comment No. 22, U.N. GAOR, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., 1247th mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPRlCI21lRev.lIAdd.4 (1993) 
(discussing Article 18 of the International Covenant). 
41. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Concluding Document 
from the Vienna Meeting, Jan. 17, 1989, prine. 16c, 28 l.L.M. 527, 534 (requiring 
signatories to "grant upon their request to communities of believers, practising or 
prepared to practise their faith within the constitutional framework of their states, 
recognition of the status provided for them in their respective countries.D ) 
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actively pursued as ofmid-1996, but the underlying debate could 
well resurface in the future.42 
On a theoretical level, the antisect sentiment that partially 
drove the proposal to de- and then re-register churches in Hun-
gary derives a part of its strength from the government's obliga-
tion to subsidize the activities of registered churches. In other 
words, the cooperationism embedded in Act IV of 1990 provides 
an incentive for the state to limit the religious liberty of small 
groups who are competing for scarce financial resources.43 Thus, 
cooperationism can force the question of the desirable balance 
between tolerance for religious liberty and the degree of church-
state separation.44 
2. Act XXXII of 1991 (Act on Settling the Ownership Status of 
Former Church Properties) 
The second major enactment by the Hungarian Parliament 
pertaining to religion was Act XXXII of 1991 which settled the 
ownership status of former church properties.45 Although the 
technical problems of restitution of former church property are 
beyond the scope of this article, one cannot begin to comprehend 
the post-Communist status of religion in Hungary without con-
sidering some material aspects of the broader questions of resti-
42. However, it bears mentioning that it was the cooperation between the 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Free Democrats (SZDSZ)-opposition parties 
prior to the 1994 election, but partners in the governing coalition since then-that 
defeated the proposed re-registration legislation. 
43. This is generally true even though it is legally possible for a church to be 
registered in Hungary, and thus enjoy the full measure of religious liberty, but to 
refrain from applying to receive financial support from the state. 
44. Developments in the Czech Republic, where members of the clergy were paid 
as state employees under Communism, reveal similar tensions arising out of 
cooperationism. In 1994, the 15 religious denominations recognized by the government 
claimed to support church-state separation in principle, but feared that they could not 
survive without state financial support. Since 1989, when churches gained the right to 
operate without Czech funding, a number of smaller denominations (e.g., Baptists, 
Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses) broke away from the state support system. 
Catholics, Jews, and the major Protestant denominations continued to accept state 
salaries, while other groups (e.g., Anglicans) were too small to qualify for state 
stipends. See Maggie L. Lawson, State No Longer Offers Churches Daily Bread, 
BUDAPESI'SUN, Apr. 7, 1994, at 8. 
45. Act XXXII of 1991, Tiirveny a volt egyhazi ingatlanok tul!\idoni helyzetenek 
rendezeserol [Act on Settling the Ownership Status of Former Church Properties], 
auailable at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h1.1991.32+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 
1996). 
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tution and compensation. Act IV of 1990 provided the framework 
of religious life in the new Hungary, but Act XXXII of 1991 gave 
it substance. 
Historically, Hungarian churches played an important role in 
education, health care, and other charitable activities, in addi-
tion to their central role in religious life. The churches, particu-
larly the larger ones, could support these activities by relying on 
their extensive property holdings.4G Most of this property was 
lost, however, through land reforms and, after 1948, nationaliza-
tions. 
Although preliminary agreement to return nationalized prop-
erty to the churches was reached in late 1990, the churches were 
not included in the first restitution law (January 1991), which 
only applied to "natural" persons. By July 1991, however, Parlia-
ment had passed Act XXXII of 1991, which permitted churches 
to reclaim some of their former properties for designated pur-
poses. It would be a mistake to characterize this law as provid-
ing full reprivatization of former church property. In fact, the 
law is not designed to "mechanically restore the state of affairs 
that prevailed before 1948.,,47 Under Act XXXII of 1991, churches 
can recover buildings and real estate they owned prior to 1948,48 
but cannot recover the assets, businesses, or farmland that pre-
viously generated income to support their activities. 
In addition to limiting the nature of the property that 
churches can recover, Act XXXII of 1991 also limits the purposes 
46. Prior to nationalization and forced takeover, the churches owned an estimated 
40,000 properties in Hungary. PUBUC RELATIONS OFFICE OF TIlE PRIME MINISTER'S 
OFFICE, FACTS AND FIGURES ABOlIT THE TRANSFER OF CIIUIlCII PROPEtmES 7 (1993) 
[hereinafter FACTS AND FIGURES). 
47. [d. at 1. 
48. As of 1993, 13 churches had filed claims for the return of nearly 6200 
properties: 3120 Catholic, 2423 Calvinist, 450 Lutheran, and 170 other. Jd. at 7. By 
May 1994, three hospitals had been returned to church management, but even after 
these transfers, less than one percent of Hungarian hospitals belonged to churches. The 
situation of schools is discussed separately in Part Ill.C.2, infra. 
As of mid-1996, approximately 3000 property claims had been settled. Claims worth 
approximately 200 billion HUF ($1.35 billion) are still outstanding. Michael J. Jordan, 
Now-Secular Hungarians Reluctant to Return Schools to Chllrch, CIIRISTL\N SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1996, at 7. Public support for returning church ;lroperties has 
diminished in the face of ongoing economic hardship in Hungary. By way of 
compromise, church leaders have agreed to extend the restitution period from ten to 
twenty years. In addition, approximately one-half of the outstanding claims arc 
expected to be paid in cash rather than in kind. Jd. 
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for which they may reclaim their former property. The churches 
may only recover property 
for religious life, the operation of orders of monks, communities 
of deacons and deaconesses, for teaching, educational, health 
and social purposes, and for performing activities related to 
child, youth protection and culture to an extent and at a pace 
that the particular church which has put in the claim is indeed 
capable of fulfilling, as well as ensuring that the church can 
continue to maintain the property.49 
In other words, the government's justification for returning 
church property was not so much to redress past wrongs as to 
"support the creation of new systems to meet the genuine social 
needs in the spheres of religious life, education and culture.,,50 
The Hungarian state views religious institutions as potential 
partners in transition that can "meet their useful and noble call-
ing"51 by performing "many ... long-forgotten tasks.,,52 
The key to enabling churches to play their envisaged role in 
transforming Hungarian society is for the state to guarantee the 
material and financial conditions needed to support the 
churches' activities. Act XXXII of 1991 is based explicitly on the 
principle of functionality: Former church property will be re-
turned if and insofar as it is necessary to ensure the churches' 
operational ability in the designated sectors.53 Yet the narrow-
ness of this restitutionary principle, together with the state's 
focus on the limited "load-bearing potential of the churches,,,54 
49. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 46, at 2. 
50. [d. at 1. It is useful here to compare restitution of church property with the 
compensation scheme established by Act XXIV of 1992, which requires the Hungarian 
state to return Jewish property seized in the 1940s (i.e., mainly gold, jewelry, and 
other possessions). The purpose was to redress past wrongs, but an incidental effect 
was to "make Jewish life flourish" in Hungary. Because of the practical problems of 
finding heirs and identifying the exact nature and value of property seized, Jewish 
groups urged the state to pay the amount of losses (estimated on the basis of archival 
and statistical data) into a Jewish reconstruction fund to be used to build hospitals, 
public centers, and schools. See Decision 1611993 (III.12.) AB, Alkotmnnybir6sng 
[Constitutional Law Courtl (Hung.) (considering whether Act XXIV of 1992 is 
compatible with Act XXV of 1946 and the Paris Peace Treaty). 
51. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 46, at 1. 
52. Foreword to id. at ii. 
53. The law makes it clear that "[tlhe operational ability of the churches can be 
ensured through the return of the original property as well as by transferring a 
property in exchange for the original, or through indemnification in cash." [d. at 2. 
54. [d. 
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significantly limits the ultimate ability of churches to fulfill this 
role. Thus under the "new type of relationship ... between the 
church and the state ... the government ensures full independ-
ence for the churches, and commensurate with its potential, con-
tributes to maintaining their operational ability."55 
Not only is state "cooperation . . . still indispensable in as-
sisting the churches [to] perform their tasks,,,SG but it is likely to 
remain so. By returning only that property which is directly 
needed for church activities, and not all former property, the 
state is proposing a cooperationist model of church-state rela-
tionship that, as a practical matter, cannot easily evolve into 
either an accommodationist or a true separationist one. This 
point brings us back to the unanswered, perhaps unanswerable 
question: What is the optimal form of church-state relationship 
for a transition society such as Hungary? 
C. Decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has been very active in 
extending protection to fundamental rights since its inception in 
1989.57 Its decisions on religion fit within this trend. When exam-
ining these decisions on religious liberty, it is especially interest-
ing to observe how the court deals with the difficult issues of de-
fining the proper church-state relationship and resolving the ten-
sion between the rights of religious liberty and equality. 
The two major decisions involve education, although each 
raises fundamentally different questions.56 The first decision, 
55. Foreword to id. at i·ii. 
56. Foreword to id. at ii; see also Paczolay, supra note I, at 6 (MThe realization 
of freedom of religion requires under the specific circumstances in post-Communist 
countries financial aid by the state, restitution of confiscated church properly, etc. Both 
restitution and the distribution of state financing among the churches create lal lot of 
conflicts. "). 
57. The Hungarian Constitutional Court, which was established by the 1989 
constitution, views itself as the "depository of the 'Rechtsstaat' Revolution. The Court 
should unconditionally guarantee that legislation and the Constitution are harmonious 
in the process of a peaceful transformation which was initiated by a Constitution based 
on the rule of law." Decision 1111992 (Il1.5.) AB, Alkolmnnybir6sng lConstitutional Law 
Court) Magyar Kozlony (Hungarian Gazette) No. 2311992 (Hung.), translated in Saj6, 
supra note 18, at 257. 
58. See Saj6, supra note 18, at 259-61. Before 1945, churches played a 
considerable role in teaching and education in Hungary. In 1938, more than 60% of 
pupils pursued their studies in elementary schools maint.'lined by churches, and the 
number of church-run schools exceeded that of state and \'illage schools. More than 
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411993, involved a challenge to Act XXXII of 1991, while the sec-
ond one, 18/1994, involved a challenge to Act LXXIX of 1993 on 
public education. Two minor decisions raise questions of discrim-
ination and will be discussed in Part IV.C below.59 
1. Decision 4/1993 
In Decision 411993,60 the court reviewed challenges to Act 
XXXII of 1991, including a claim that this law violated Article 60 
of the 1989 constitution. More precisely, the claim was that res-
titution of former church property which was being used for edu-
cational purposes violated the constitutional right to freedom of 
conscience and religion because it failed to guarantee that there 
would be an ideologically neutral school in every residential set-
tlement. The court decided that Act XXXII of 1991 was not un-
constitutional for its failure to guarantee a neutral public 
school6! in every settlement, provided that whenever the state 
returns school property back to church ownership, it must also 
protect the rights of those who do not wish to attend (or to have 
their children attend) a confessional school.62 In legal terms, the 
court required the state to guarantee such persons a "real alter-
native" by making it possible to attend a neutral public school 
without suffering any disproportionate inconvenience or burden. 
one-third of students pursuing secondary school studies attended schools of somo 
denomination. The churches also operated faculties of law, teacher training colleges, 
and theological universities. By way of contrast, in 1989 there were no church or 
denominational kindergartens or primary schools, and the colleges of theology did not 
belong to the higher educational institutions recognized by the state. There were, 
however, 3600 students who attended 11 church-run secondary schools. FACTS AND 
FIGURES, supra note 46, at 9-10. 
By mid-1994, the following schools were in church hands: 32 kindergartens, 78 
elementary schools, 3 special education schools, 47 secondary schools, 7 
Fachmittelschulen, 6 Berufschulen, 5 schools for national minorities, and 29 institutions 
of higher education. See 1992193 & 1993/94.evi oktat<isi intezmenyek sZRma ilI.tanul6i 
letszama (Report by Department of Church Relations on 1992-93 and 1993-94 Academic 
Yearsl (on file with author). 
59. See text accompanying notes 94-96. 
60. Decision 4/1993 m.12.) AB, Alkotmanybir6sag [Constitutional Law Courtl, 
Magyar Kozlony (Hungarian Gazette) No. 1511993 (Hung.), available at 
<http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h3.1993.4+-ml> (visited Nov. 27, 1996). 
61. The technical Hungarian term is semleges iskola. 
62. The technical Hungarian term is elkOtelezett iskola. 
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2. Decision 18/1994 
In Decision 1811994,63 the Court reviewed a challenge to sec-
tion 81(l)(a) and section 125 of Act LXXIX of 1993 on public edu-
cation.64 Section 81(l)(a) is a rather confusing provision, which 
states in essence that there is no obligation for nongovernmental 
or nonmunicipal (i.e., nonpublic) entities, such as churches, to 
maintain neutral (Le., nonconfessional) schools. This negative 
formulation should also be understood to mean that confessional 
educational institutions may be established or maintained only 
by nonpublic sponsors such as churches. The challengers claimed 
that this provision was unconstitutional because it prevented 
governmental or municipal entities from establishing or main-
taining confessional schools. The court disagreed, and ruled that 
the neutral public education system established by section 81 
was compatible with the constitution. Thus, Decision 18/1994 
stands for the proposition that the state may not establish or 
maintain confessional schools, whereas Decision 411993 held that 
the state is not obliged to establish such schools, even though it 
must make it legally possible for confessional schools to exist. 
IV. LIBERTY, SEPARATION, AND EQUALITY 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court's analysis in Decisions 
411993 and 18/1994 involves three issues. The follO\ving discus-
sion of these two cases examines these issues in increasing order 
of difficulty: first, religious freedom; second, church-state separa-
tion; and third, equality. 
A. Religious Liberty 
The least controversial aspect of Decisions 411993 and 
18/1994 is their analysis of the meaning of religious liberty. This 
is not because the issue is inherently uncontroversial, but rather 
because the questions presented in these cases did not turn on 
this issue. Thus, the court's pronouncements may be regarded as 
63. Decision 1811994 (III.3!.) AB, Alkotmanybir6sag (Constitutional Law Court( 
(Hung.), available at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h3.1994.18+-mb (visited 
Nov. 27, 1996). 
64. Act LXXIX of 1993, Ttirveny a ktizoktatasr61 (Act on Public Education(, 
available at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-hl.1993.79+-mb (visited Nov. 27, 
1996). 
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fundamental policy statements which indicate its views on the 
subject but which have little immediate significance. 
In Decision 411993, the court sought to ascertain the nature 
of religious freedom by examining its relationship with other 
fundamental rights and by inquiring into the permissible limits 
on such civil rights. In the court's view, the most fundamental 
right is the right to human dignity, which includes the right to 
life and legal capacity, in addition to the general personality 
right to free assertion of oneself. Personality is "untouchable" by 
law; the court argued that "law can only aid autonomy by guar-
anteeing external conditions."65 The freedom of action derived 
from fundamental personality rights carries even greater weight, 
according to the court, when the action stems from conscience or 
from religious belief, which is the "essence ofpersonality."66 
The court asserted that the right to practice religion is the 
most important of the rights embodied in Article 60,67 because 
this aspect of religious liberty is most closely related to freedom 
of expression, the "mother right" which occupies a distinguished 
place in the hierarchy of fundamental rights.68 The court noted 
that it is possible for law to limit the practice of religion-in con-
trast to internal beliefs or thoughts-just as the state can regu-
late speech and other forms of expression.69 
In Decision 411993 the Constitutional Court did not define 
the permissible restraints on the practice of religion, although it 
did announce two key principles. First, the court mentioned that 
any law limiting religious liberty must be interpreted restric-
tively.70 Second, it emphasized that the state must take a neu-
tral stance when circumscribing the practice ofreligion.71 In this 
context, "neutrality" means that any restriction must be limited 
65. Decision 411993 (11.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 3 (on file with author). 
66. [d. at 4. 
67. A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution) art. 60 (Hung.). 
68. Decision 411993 (II.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 4. One might well take issue 
with this ranking: The fact that speech (and religious practice) can be the subject of 
state regulation, whereas the right of thought or conscience cannot, suggests that it 
is the latter (and not the former) which occupies the higher rank among fundamental 
liberties. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 1. 
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to the external manifestation and may not consider the content 
(i.e., the value or veracity) of the thought or belief.72 
B. Church-State Separation 
In Decision 411993, the court also relied heavily on the con-
cept of "neutrality" in its discussion of church-state separation, 
but it used the term in a way which could be described as "very 
benevolent neutrality" in the accommodationist sense. The court 
repeatedly emphasized that the state must be neutral in matters 
of religious belief and other matters of conscience, and bases this 
conclusion on Article 60(3) of the constitution, which provides 
that "the church functions in separation from the State.,,73 The 
court went on to explain at length what it meant by "neutrality" 
in this context. 
The starting point for understanding the Constitutional 
Court's position on church-state separation is its clear statement 
in Decision 411993 that the state may not (1) institutionally link 
with any church or churches; (2) subscribe to any of the churches' 
teachings; or (3) interfere with the internal affairs of the 
churches or take a stand in questions concerning truths in be-
lief.74 From these parameters of separation, the court concluded 
that the state must "treat all Churches equally" as required by 
Article 70lA of the constitution.75 However, it went on to add 
that neutrality is only required with regard to the religious be-
liefs and practices of a church.76 Thus, the principle that all laws 
must be equally applied is limited. Indeed, the court's interpreta-
tion permits lawmakers to take into account the different char-
acteristics of churches-notably "their history and their role in 
Hungarian society"-when drafting legislation.77 Unfortunately, 
the court did not provide any further indication of how it would 
apply such different characteristics or why they are justified. It 
is, however, apparent that this limitation on the principle of neu-
72. [d. at 4. 
73. A MAGYAR KOZTARsASAG ALKOThlANYA [Constitution) arL 60(3) (Hung.), 
translated in CONsrlTUI'IONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 8. Peter 
Paczolay notes that the "liberal constitutional doctrine of the separation of state and 
church had no traditional roots in Hungary." Paczo!ay, supra note I, at 12. 
74. Decision 411993 (II.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 4. 
75. [d.; see supra note 16. 
76. Decision 411993 (II.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 5. 
77. [d. 
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trality is designed to accord to the Catholic church the position of 
"first among equals." 
Decision 411993 contains an eloquent statement of the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court's accommodationist view of church-
state separation, according to which the state's role is to provide 
a neutral legal system within which both religion and irreligion 
may exist. Thus, the requirement of neutrality (or separation) 
does not mean that the state must be indifferent to religion.78 On 
the contrary, the court suggested that the state would violate its 
obligation if it did not make it possible for everyone to make a 
conscious choice between religion and irreligion.79 In a classic 
statement of a positive right, the court explained that the state's 
obligation to respect and protect fundamental rights does not 
merely require the state to refrain from violating civil rights, but 
also requires the state to provide the conditions necessary to 
enable the exercise of religious liberty. Thus, the proper relation-
ship between church and state is one where 
[t]he state is obligated to guarantee a large scope for the ex-
pression, teaching, and following of religious belief, for the op-
eration of Churches, as well as for being able to refuse a reli-
gion, and for being able to be silent about one's religious belief; 
a scope where different conceptions can form freely, and 
through which it is possible to form one's personal belief.so 
Neutrality, in other words, does not mean inactivity, nor does it 
require the state to neglect religion. Thus, "the defense of a fun-
damental right is not a simple passive protection."81 
In concluding its general discussion of church-state separa-
tion, the court emphasized that the relationship between church 
and state is a function of each country's history.82 In defense of 
the extensive degree of church-state entanglement in areas such 
as education, health care and charity, the court referred to the 
historical role of the churches in these fields, and argued that 
separation and cooperation are not contradictory. The court 
treated the constitutionally-mandated separation as a strict 
ideal which cannot be readily achieved in practice, and accepted 
78. [d. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 6. 
81. Paczolay, supra note 1, at 12. 
82. Decision 4/1993 (lI.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 5. 
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cooperation and accommodation as unavoidable during the pe-
riod of transition.83 Yet the court never undertook to examine 
the separationist ideal itself. 
The court's pronouncements regarding obligatory school edu-
cation, which was at issue in both Decisions 411993 and 18/1994, 
further illustrate both its understanding of religious liberty as a 
positive right and its willingness to tolerate deviations from the 
ideal of separation embodied in the constitution during transi-
tion. Both the constitution and Act N of 1990 guarantee parents 
the right to educate their children in matters of religion. The 
critical question is thus how to effectuate this right. 
Recall that in Decisions 1411993 and 18/1994, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court explained that the state must establish the 
legal framework within which both confessional and neutral (i.e., 
nonreligious) schools can exist.54 Further, the court laid down the 
rule that the state is neither permitted nor required to establish 
or maintain confessional (i.e., non-neutral or religious) schools. 
According to the court, all public (i.e., state-maintained) schools 
must be neutral.85 In this context, "neutral" means that schools 
cannot be committed to any religion or ideology. Instead, schools 
must enable each student to make a "free and well-founded 
choice" by providing "religious and ideological information that is 
objective, critical and pluralistic."SG This accommodationist view 
of public education flows from the positive nature of religious 
liberty in Hungary: The state uses the public school system to 
lay the foundation for, indeed to enable the exercise of religious 
liberty, in a manner that would be vigorously challenged in a 
separationist system such as the United States. 
The Hungarian state does not stop at accommodation, how-
ever; it also provides a high degree of cooperation in the realm of 
83. See Saj6, supra note 18, at 257·58 <observing that "the Court has repeatedly 
declared that constitutionalism has to be interpreted under the 'unique and special 
circumstances of regime transformation'· and noting the Court's use of '''historical 
exceptionality' ... to justify what the judges felt would otherwise be a departure from 
strict constitutionalism, namely, when confiscated property was partly returned to the 
Church, and the Church was granted support from the budget, despite the fact that 
the Church is independent of the State under the Constitution"). 
84. Act LXXIX of 1993 § 125 obliges the state to enact a legal framework for the 
establishment and maintenance of confessional schools (as well as nonreligious ones) 
within five years, and states that the legal conditions governing both types of schools 
must be the same. 
85. Decision 411993 (Il.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 8. 
86. ld. 
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mandatory education, despite the basic principles of church~state 
separation and neutrality. Two examples stand out. First, in the 
context of restitution of former church-owned school property, 
section 125 of Act LXXIX of 1993 provides that the state will 
maintain existing confessional schools which have not yet been 
returned to church ownership qua non-neutral institutions for a 
five-year period. This means that the state will be operating and 
fully supporting confessional schools for up to five years. This 
extraordinary situation was challenged in Decision 18/1994, but 
upheld by the court, which held that it would be unreasonable to 
close down existing confessional schools just because the restitu~ 
tion process could not be completed right away. Here again, the 
court explicitly recognized separation as the ultimate goal, but 
accepted an extraordinarily high degree of cooperation as a pro~ 
visional solution. Second, Act IV of 1990 requires the state to 
support confessional schools insofar as they have undertaken 
tasks belonging to the state.S7 Thus, the legal framework for edu~ 
cation by the churches foresees permanent subsidization by the 
state to a "normatively defined extent."ss 
In the area of mandatory education, then, the exceptional 
circumstances of transition are deemed to justifY a very high de~ 
gree of church-state cooperation in Hungary. Even after the 
transition period, however, it appears that the Hungarian stateS9 
will provide ongoing financial support to confessional schools, in 
addition to hospitals and other charitable institutions operated 
by the churches. 
c. Equality 
The problem of equality or nondiscrimination in the context 
of religion refers largely to the tension between the state's obli~ 
gation to permit the exercise of religious liberty, on the one 
hand, and its obligation of separation or neutrality, on the other. 
In other words, any state act that specifically permits or protects 
religious liberty may simultaneously privilege religion over irre~ 
87. Act IV of 1990, Tiirveny a lelkiismereti es a valIasszabadsagr61, valamint az 
egyha.zakr61 [Act on Religion, Freedom of Conscience, and Churches] § 19(1), available 
at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-bin/jrxs?-h1.1990.4+-m1> (visited Nov. 27, 1996) 
(unofficial translation on file with author). This requirement also applies to health, 
sport, welfare, and other charitable institutions operated by churches in Hungary. 
88. [d. 
89. If not the central, then the local government. 
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ligion. The Hungarian Constitutional Court recognized this ten-
sion clearly in Decision 411993, in which it stated that church-
state separation does not "influence . . . the obligation of the 
state to ... guarantee positive and negative freedom of religion 
without discrimination. Positive and negative freedom of religion 
are equal: [T]he state cannot take any of them as the basic case 
and say that the other is [the] exception."90 
Despite this rhetoric, however, the position of the Hungarian 
state, as detailed in the earlier discussion of religious liberty and 
church-state separation, can hardly be described as indifferent to 
religion. By devoting significant state resources to churches, the 
Hungarian state is clearly favoring religion over irreligion. 
Yet the paradox of transition is that such support is neces-
sary, much like "affirmative action" programs to assist disadvan-
taged minority groups in the United States and India are neces-
sary for the beneficiaries to overcome past disadvantage and be-
come equal enough to survive in a truly neutral environment. 
Equality, like church-state separation, thus proves to be an ideal 
that can only be achieved by administering limited doses of its 
opposite. With regard to both separation and equality, the court 
has elevated the need for remedial measures over rhetoric. 
Equality rhetoric is particularly susceptible to misuse, since it 
can be invoked so easily in many different contexts. 
On the whole, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been 
sensitive to discrimination issues arising during transition. It 
held in Decision 21/199091 that it was impermissible, in principle, 
for the state to discriminate between former owners of land and 
former owners of other types of assets in the context of privatiza-
tion, as well as to discriminate between former property owners 
and other individuals who did not previously own property. In 
practice, however, the court has permitted positive discrimina-
tion in favor of former property owners, so long as procedural 
fairness is ensured and the preferential treatment yields a more 
favorable total social result than equal treatment would yield. 
The court's willingness to tolerate positive discrimination is 
even more apparent in Decision 411993. There, Act XXXII of 
90. Decision 411993 (II.12.) AB, unofficial trans. at 5. 
91. Decision 2111990 (X.4.) AB, Alkotmlinybir6sng IConstitutional Law Courtl 
(Hung.), available at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi.binljrxs?·h3.1990.21+-ml> (visited 
Nov. 27, 1996). 
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1991 was challenged on the ground that it discriminates against 
churches having no former properties, as well as against nonreli-
gious groups92 whose former properties had not been returned by 
the state. The court agreed with the challengers that it is uncon-
stitutional to compensate churches for property loss when other 
groups are denied such compensation. However, it held lawful 
the restitution of former church properties based on the principle 
of functionality, since restitution is necessary in order to guaran-
tee a fundamental right-religious liberty-as well as to effectu-
ate the separation of church and state.93 
The matter of discrimination was also raised in three other 
cases. In the first case, Decision 8/1993,94 the Constitutional 
Court rejected a claim that Act IV of 1990 was discriminatory 
because its registration provisions require at least 100 members 
to found a church. According to the court, the fact that smaller 
groups are not able to register does not affect the most impor-
tant practices of a religious community (i.e., worship, education, 
and the provision of various social services). However, the court 
did not address the question whether the inability of such 
smaller religious communities to own property or to be eligible 
for tax-exempt status would constitute discrimination. 
The second case, Decision 10/1993,95 involved a challenge to 
the state's failure to make the most important Jewish holi-
days-like the most important Christian holidays-work-free 
days. The Constitutional Court held that this was not discrimi-
natory, since the main Christian holidays are secularized and 
have a general social character. In other words, Easter and 
Christmas are not work-free days solely "because of their reli-
gious content but because of economic considerations and be-
cause they comply with the expectations of society."96 
92. Examples mentioned by the court include political parties, business 
organizations, labor unions, and bar associations. 
93. Decision 4/1993 (II.l2.) AB, unofficial trans. at 17. 
94. Decision 8/1993 (Il.27.) AB, Alkotmanybirosag [Constitutional Law Court), 
Magyar Kozlony (Hungarian Gazette) No. 2211993, discussed in Paczo!ay, supra noto 
I, at 16-17, and auailable at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h3.1993.8+-ml> 
(visited Nov. 27, 1996). 
95. Decision 10/1993 (Il.27.) AB, Alkotmanybirosag [Constitutional Law Court), 
Magyar Kozlony (Hungarian Gazette) No. 2211993, discussed in Paczolay, supra noto 
I, at 17, and auailable at <http://www.spiderweb.hulcgi-binljrxs?-h3.1993.10+-ml> 
(visited Nov. 27, 1996). 
96. Paczolay, supra note I, at 17. 
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Finally, in Decision 18/1994, the challengers argued that Act 
LXXIX of 1993 on public education discriminates against govern-
mental and municipal entities because it prevents them from 
establishing or maintaining confessional schools. The Constitu-
tional Court, perhaps wisely, refused to analyze this rather per-
verse question. 
These few pronouncements on equality demonstrate that the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court has resolved the tension be-
tween equality and rights in favor of the latter. At the same 
time, however, it appears that the court has established a spe-
cial role for religion and might not be willing to extend its gener-
ous reasoning to other rights. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Many uncertainties accompanied the mid-1994 change in 
government in Hungary, among them the role of religion. Out-
side Central Europe, an assessment of the first five-year post-
Communist period would probably celebrate the great improve-
ments in Hungarian church-state relations since 1989. In Hun-
gary, however, where the order of the day is still survival, a 
more modest assessment is warranted. Although the legal struc-
tures are in place, the material conditions for the churches' sur-
vival are not yet assured. Jesus is said to have fed a multitude 
with seven loaves of bread and a few fishes. It remains to be 
seen how well churches in post-Communist society can do with 
only half a loaf. Still, half a loaf is better than none. 
